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Gary Edmond* and
Kent Roach**

Trial by Theory: A Response to Acharya's
"Law's Treatment of Science: From
Idealization to Understanding"

Adopting a pragmatic and empirically sensitive approach to the use of forensic
science and medicine, this essay defends Edmond and Roach's "AContextual
Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science and Medical
Evidence." The authors reiterate their concerns about idealized approaches
to science and expertise and question the utility of philosophically-driven and
essentialist models of science for legal practice. In detail the essay explains why
privileging process over outcomes in the criminal process (and even perpetuating
the dichotomy) is misguided.
The authors affirm the importance of factual accuracy and the socio-institutional
illegitimacy generated by wrongful convictions. Drawing upon recent inquiries
and recommendations which confirm their concerns about endemic problems
confronting contemporary forensic science and medicine-especially around the
limited research base-and noting the demonstrated frailties of accusatorial trials
and appeals, the authors continue to advocate "demonstrable reliability" as an
admissibility prophylactic.

Cet essai adopte une approche de lutilisation.de la science et de la mddecine
16gales 6 la fois pragmatique et qui prend le contexte en compte de mani6re
empirique pour se porter la d6fense de IParticle de MM. Edmond et Roach intitul6
- A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science
and Medical Evidence. - Les auteurs r6it6rent leurs prdoccupations face aux
approches idealisdes de la science et des comp6tences, et ils s'interrogent sur
I'utilit6, pour la pratique du droit, des mod6les de sciences ax6s sur la philosophie
et I'essentialisme.L'essai explique en d6tail pourquoi il est malavis6 de privil6gier
le processus aux d6pens des r6sultats dans le processus penal (et m6me de
perp6tuer la dichotomie).
Les auteurs affirment limportance de l'exactitude factuelle et de I'ill6gitimit6
socio-institutionnelle d6coulant de d6clarations de culpabilit6 injustifi6es.
S'appuyant sur des enqu6tes et des recommandations r6centes qui confirment
leurs pr6occupations quant aux probl6mes end6miques qui affligent la science
et la m6dicine 16gales contemporaines-en particulier pour ce qui est du petit
effectif de chercheurs-et soulignant les faiblesses d6montr6es des proc6s et
des appels 6 caract6re accusatoire, les auteurs continuent 6 insister pour que la
fiabilit6 des affirmations soit demontr6e avant qu'elles ne puissent 6tre admises
en preuve.
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Introduction
In this essay we respond to Nayha Acharya's commentary on "A
Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science
and Medical Evidence" (hereafter ACA).' Although we are grateful for
the attention she has paid to our work, we cannot agree with her argument
that we rely on idealized images of science or expertise. Our intention
was to take a contextual and pragmatic approach that responded to the
emerging evidence about the frailties of forensic science and medicine and
the traditional accusatorial trial.
Notwithstanding the title of Acharya's essay, it is also our contention
that her approach to expert evidence and legal procedure is far more
idealistic than our own. Moreover, it risks reifying existing legal practices
while providing little sense of how or why rules and procedures should
be reformed. In particular, we disagree with Acharya's contention that
the "procedural legitimacy" she attributes to the existing criminal justice
system justifies a range of outcomes, including procedurally regular but
wrongful convictions of the innocent.
ACA was intended as a response to emerging problems with the
forensic sciences and trial safeguards resulting in the admission of
1. (2011) 61 UTLJ 343 [Edmond & Roach]; Nayha Acharya, "Law's Treatment of Science: From
Idealization to Understanding" (2013) 36 Dal U 1.
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speculative expert opinion evidence, inadequate assessment at trial, and
wrongful convictions. Here we are referring to the report of the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS), a large volume of scholarly criticism, as
well as inquiries and reports (e.g., Law Commission of England and
Wales) undertaken in the aftermath of both the NAS report and unfolding
miscarriages of justice and wrongful convictions in Canada (e.g., the
Goudge Inquiry) and beyond (e.g., the Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry).2
Drawing on criminal justice principles-such as the importance of factual
rectitude, fairness, and not convicting the innocent (a legally-inflected
version of rectitude that orients procedures and practices from the burden
and standard of proof to the admissibility of some kinds of evidence)--we
endeavoured to craft a response that incorporated these values in ways
that paid attention to emerging evidence. This is why we described our
proposal as "contextual (or reflexive)." 3
We advocated the introduction of a more demanding admissibility
standard-namely, "demonstrable reliability"-to prevent insufficiently
reliable forensic science and medicine from contaminating criminal
proceedings. We would prevent juries being exposed to unreliable
and speculative opinions from well-credentialled and experienced
witnesses-particularly those proffered by prosecutors. Part of this
exclusionary orientation is derived from familiarity with contemporary
criminal proceedings and the frailty of trial safeguards. Serious limitations
with expert opinion evidence are not always identified, nor adequately
conveyed to fact-finders at trial or appellate judges on review. This means
that legal aspirations and principles, particularly the concern with "doing
justice in the pursuit of truth," are routinely compromised in practice. 4 To
help lawyers, trial judges, and expert witnesses with the interpretation of
"demonstrable reliability" we explained that Daubert-style criteria will
often be helpful in criminaljustice settings. Acknowledging the need for
flexibility in the development and application of any admissibility standard
it is, nevertheless, our contention that when challenged the state should be
able to support its proffer of incriminating expert opinion evidence with
2.
Commission on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, National Research
Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2009) [NAS report]; Law Commission of England and Wales, Expert
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales, 34 Law Com Report No 325 (London:
HMSO, 2011); Hon Stephen Goudge, Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology (Toronto: Queen's
Printer of Ontario, 2008) [Goudge Inquiry]; Lord Campbell, The Fingerprint Inquiry Report
(Edinburgh: APS Group Scotland, 2011).
3.
Edmond & Roach, supra note I at 396.
4.
This formulation is taken from HL Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for
Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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evidence of ability and accuracy. That is, there should be good grounds for
believing that the techniques and derivative opinions relied upon by the
state are trustworthy.5
In this vein we proposed an asymmetrical approach to admissibility.
We stated a preference for imposing a more onerous admissibility standard
upon the state than the accused when it comes to adducing expert opinion
evidence. For it is the state that adduces the vast majority of this evidence
and only the state has the resources and responsibility to undertake the
necessary empirical evaluation. We suggested that this position could be
grounded in criminal justice values, but also linked it to revelations about
the forensic sciences and ordinary trial practice. Nevertheless, our support
for asymmetry was qualified. To the extent that an expressly asymmetrical
standard was unpalatable, we explained that an admissibility standard
based on the need for demonstrable reliability applied symmetrically,
to the state and those accused of criminal acts, would reduce the risk of
substantial unfairness, factual errors, and wrongful convictions. One of
our premises is that unreliable and speculative opinions have no place in
the accusatorial criminal trial.
Acharya on law and science: the primacy of "procedurallegitimacy"
Criticizing ACA and work by Haack (also discussed in this volume) as
idealized,6 Acharya suggests that our approach is excessively empirical.'
She argues that our call for empirical and experimental evidence as the
basis for grounding the admissibility of forensic science and medicine
evidence distorts proper legal practice.8 In contrast to our interest in the
reliability of techniques relied upon by the state, Acharya places emphasis
on how law and science each obtain their "legitimacy through adherence
to procedure."'
For science, the procedures are said to include "the scientific
method"-a version of Popperian falsification including scope for
replication-along with peer review.' 0 This leads Acharya to conclude that
the "work of scientists is... legitimately scientific if it follows the current
5. This draws, for example, from the definition of "knowledge" in Daubert v Merrell Dow
PharmaceuticalsInc, 509 US 579 (1993) and the US Federal Rule of Evidence [FRE] 702. See also
Uniform Evidence Law, s 79(1) and R v Tang (2006), 65 NSWLR 681.
6.
As Haack is also responding we focus exclusively on our own work.
7. The juxtaposition of idealization and excessive empiricism is, itself, curious.
8. Acharya, supranote 1.
9.
Ibid note I at 3. Though not developed by Acharya, this approach has an autopoietic flavour, see,
e.g., G Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System, translated by Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1993).
10. Compare Gary Edmond & David Mercer, "What Judges Should Know about Falsificationism"
(1997) 5 Expert Evidence 29.
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accepted methodologies, or rules of procedure. ...Scientific validity can
be thought of as depending on following a method consisting of rules and
procedures in a similar way that law does.""
According to Acharya, law's rules and procedures are concerned with
''accuracy in fact-finding" but constrained by "the need for timely dispute
resolution, economic constraints, and numerous sources of error [such
as 'evidentiary gaps'] that exist within the adjudicative process." 2 The
legal system accepts that there will be evidentiary gaps created by trying
to determine events "that occurred in the past."" Moreover, legal rules
sometimes restrict (i.e., exclude) "useful evidence." 4 "In short, the legal
system accepts the inevitability of evidentiary gaps-sometimes it even
causes them."" The uncertainty that results from the evidentiary gaps
means there is always a risk of error.
In criminal proceedings, according to Acharya, uncertainty is managed
through the burden and standard of proof. The state, in consequence, is
required to prove the elements of any offence beyond reasonable doubt.
The legitimacy of the "adjudicative process" is maintained despite risks
of discrepancies between "legal fact-finding and actual fact" by making
the allocation of risk, in areas of uncertainty, fair. Echoing Laudan's
philosophical discussion of the "distribution of errors," "the burdens of
proof represent a fair allocation of the risk that erroneous fact-finding
occurs."" Using, for the sake of illustration, a standard of ninety-five per
cent to represent proof beyond reasonable doubt, Acharya argues that the
high burden is fair and that: "if there is an error, it is much more likely to
fall on the side of not-guilty than guilty.""
While we have reservations about this mechanistic description of
proof, Acharaya's claims for the ability of procedures to instantiate
legitimacy for both law and science become even stronger.
This description is incomplete, however, because it suggests that
conditions of uncertainty result in the legal system being inevitably

11. Acharya, supra note I at 9-10, see also 7, 16.
12. Ibid at 10.
13. Ibid at 13.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid at 12.
17. Ibid at 12. Larry Laudan, Truth, Error and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Laudan's challenging text is self-consciously
driven by theoretical commitments and abstract approaches to rules and criminal justice practice.
Unfortunately, it does not focus attention on scientific evidence, notwithstanding Laudan's eminence
as a philosopher of science.
18. Acharya, supranote 1 at 13.

62 The Dalhousie Law Journal

flawed, and that fair allocation of risk is the band-aid covering the errors
that will inevitably result. I suggest, however, that when adjudicative
decisions are made based on legal facts that do not correspond with actual
reality, such decisions are not necessarily illegitimate. Adjudicative
decisions made based on inaccurate fact-finding are nonetheless
legitimate legal decisions ifthey adhere to procedural rules, much in the
same way as scientific outcomes can be legitimately scientific even if
they do not represent the factual reality.'I
According to Acharya, "[a]djudicative outcomes that do not correspond
with factual reality can still be legitimate." 20 The potential unpalatability
of "legal facts"-those inconsistent with reality-is overcome through
procedural propriety. 21
Consequently, an adjudicative decision is legitimate when the fact-finder
makes a decision based on the evidence that is properly before her at
trial and appropriately measures that evidence to the relevant standard of
proof. Whether the adjudicative decision corresponds with factual reality
does not itself compromise the legitimacy of the resulting adjudicative

decision. 22

We will criticize this approach in the fourth part of this comment, but at this
juncture it is important to understand that Acharya supports the procedural
legitimacy of the law even when it produces incorrect decisions. That is,
arrives at conclusions that are inconsistent with scientific knowledgewhich in her view "is clearly more dedicated to empirical truth than law."2 3
This strong distinction between the defining procedures of law and
science, leads Acharya to criticize our proposal on the basis that we exhibit
"a preference for empirical inquiry and an under-emphasis on procedural
legitimacy in law."24 In Acharya's view the emphasis placed on "empirical
testing to establish demonstrable reliability" in ACA seems to suggest
a "risky preference for empirical reasoning that" 25 has the potential to
"cause an inadvertent usurping of legal reasoning."2 6 Indeed, our major
transgression seems to have been the "use of science-like constructs to

19. Ibid at 13. Interestingly, Daubert'sattempt to distinguish between methods and conclusions was
quickly abandoned in General Electric Co v Joiner, 522 US 136 (1997).
20. Acharya, supranote I at 13.
21. For Acharya, "legal facts" are the procedurally legitimate result of the proper combination of
evidence, procedures, and substantial law.
22. Acharya, supranote 1 at 13-14.
23. Ibid at 15.
24. Ibid at 17.
25. Ibid at 24.
26. Ibid.
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re-introduce legitimacy into the trial process," thereby revealing an "overcommitment to empirical legitimacy."27
When it comes to our principle-based and evidence-sensitive proposal
for an admissibility standard applied differentially to the state and those
it accuses, somewhat curiously, our motivations are reduced to concerns
about:
(1) lack of scientific literacy among lawyers and judges and (2) economic
imbalances that result in the state having much better access to experts
than defendants.28
For Acharya, our position exhibits a "two wrongs make a right" flavour,
such that the disadvantages facing the defence warrant under-valuing
strict "consistency in procedure as a requirement of achieving legitimate
adjudicative outcomes." 29
In addition, our presentation of demonstrable reliability as "an attempt
to restore some legitimacy to the criminal trial process," "compromised
due to practical inequalities," is characterized as "imbalanced,"
"improper," "distorting," and "exclusively" oriented to the "protection
of the accused."30 Concentrating on "how detrimental the trial process is
to the accused" leads us to "under-emphasize that the burden of proof
enormously favours the accused."" Acharya insists that "altering the
procedural admissibility rules through which evidence is presented to the
trier of fact is an unjustifiable compromise to legal procedure" caused
by our "(creditable) over-emphasis on protection of the accused." 2 Our
failure to consider the effects of an asymmetrical evidentiary standard
on the burden of proof is "particularly detrimental" because "the burden
of proof (itself a representation of criminal justice values) is part of the
substantive criminal law that dictates what standard of proof the evidence
must attain in order for an element of an offence to be legally proven."
This approach, it is said, "undermines the substantive burden of proof...
making it harder for the Crown to meet its burden of proof."34

27. Ibid at 28.
28. Ibid at 22.
29. Ibid at 22.
30. Ibid at 26.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid at 27.
33. Ibid at 26.
34. Ibid.
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I. Against idealism (and essentialism) in the sciences
In commencing our response, there are two important points to make. First,
we explicitly reject idealized and essentialized models of science. Second,
it is our contention that the philosophy of science has not provided a legally
serviceable description of the nature of scientific practice or reasoning.
Indeed, we would contend that the sciences are so historically contingent
and varied that there are no essential (or prescriptive) procedures that
apply across the spectrum." We doubt whether a philosophically-driven
model of science would be particularly useful to legal practice.3 6 In
consequence, we find Acharya's descriptions of science and law and their
putative methods simplistic. To the extent that her response is predicated
upon maintaining a consistent methodological distinction between law and
science and, more importantly, grounding legal and scientific practice in
clear and prescriptive procedures, we find claims about legitimacy derived
through procedural regularity (and consistency) implausible."
Writing in response to an essay that accuses us of idealizing science, it
seems important to introduce some of the inconsistent evidence up front."
35. Even a sociologist of science such as Harry Collins, who now suggests that there are some
features that distinguish (gravitational) science from other pursuits, does not suggest that these can be
used as rules to resolve debates or controversy. See H Collins, Gravity s Ghost: Scientific Discovery in
the Twenty-First Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), especially "Envoi." Compare
S Shapin, Never Pure: HistoricalStudies of Science as if it Was Produced by People with Bodies,
Situated in Time, Space, Culture,and Society, andStrugglingforCredibilityandAuthority (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).
36. Typically, most philosophers (and even some sociologists) of science are insensitive to legal
practice and most legal practitioners (and scholars) are insensitive to philosophy, and especially the
history, philosophy, and sociology of science. See, for example, Brian Leiter, "The Epistemology of
Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of
Evidence" (1997) BYUL Rev 803.
37. Sociological accounts, drawing upon the later work of Wittgenstein, have explained how difficult
narrow method protocols and even scientific norms are to apply in particular situations, and especially
in times of uncertainty and controversy. See, e.g., H Collins, Changing Order: Replication and
Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); M Mulkay & N Gilbert, "Putting Philosophy
to Work: Karl Popper's Influence on Scientific Practice" (1981) 11 Philosophy of the Social Sciences
389; H Collins & T Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know about Science (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
38. Edmond was originally trained in the history and philosophy of science and is a regular
contributor to specialist sociology (and social studies) of science journals. His honours supervisor was
a doctoral student of Thomas S Kuhn at Princeton University from 1969 to 1973. In addition, Edmond
has written several essays cautioning about judicial idealization of science. This background and the
body of published work does not preclude the possibility of idealization, but it ought to caution against
approaching ACA as an attempt to impose idealised images of science on law or misconstrue law and
legal practice. See, e.g., Gary Edmond, "Judicial Representations of Scientific Evidence" (2000) 63
Mod L Rev 216 [Edmond, "Judicial Representations"]; Gary Edmond, "Supersizing Daubert:Science
for Litigation and Its Implications for Legal Practice and Scientific Research" (2007) 52 Vill L Rev
857 [Edmond, "Supersizing Daubert"]; Gary Edmond & David Mercer, "Trashing 'junk' science"
(1998) 3 Stan Tech L Rev; Andrew Ligertwood & Gary Edmond, AustralianEvidence: A Principled
Approach to the Common Law and the Unform Acts, 5th ed (Sydney: LexisNexis, 2010).
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In ACA we repeatedly explained that we are writing against an idealized
or essentialist approach to the sciences."
Examples of such commitments and the need for caution include:
Rather than focus upon features of idealized versions of science such as
are associated with essentialized readings of Daubert,it is our contention
that admissibility decisions should be primarily shaped by legal principle
and criminal-justice values. 40
Unfortunately, there is no simple way to identify reliable knowledge
or distinguish scientific from non-scientific activity. The contextual
approach advocated in this article encouragesjudges to develop and apply
standards tailored to particular expertise and particular controversies. 4 1
ACTUAL RELIABILITY RATHER THAN 'SCIENCE,' 'NONSCIENCE,' OR DA UBERT'
In many ways, the questions of whether Daubertembodies the essentials
of genuine science and whether we can develop useful means of
demarcating science from other types of knowledge and experience are
distractions. Rather than getting bogged down in sterile and intractable
attempts at demarcation or efforts to characterize particular attributes
as essential ingredients of the modem sciences, we suggest that the
Daubert criteria do not embody the essence of all authentic scientific
activity and, importantly, that the more fundamental issue for criminal
investigations and trials is the actual reliability of incriminating expert
opinions. Regardless of whether some technique, method, or ability
is characterized as science-based or experience-based, given the high
stakes ofthe criminal trial (and its obvious deficiencies), the admissibility
of incriminating expert opinion should be dependant on evidence of its
reliability that is empirical and demonstrative. The Supreme Court of

39.
40.
41.

For the purposes of this essay, there is no need to distinguish between these terminologies.
Edmond & Roach, supra note I at 396-397, 346.
Ibidat4O5.

66 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Canada's decision in Trochym has great potential in this regard. It rejects
the idea that threshold-reliability concerns should be limited to novel
science or left to weight. 4 2
Our concerns with idealization and its dangers for legal practice are
palpable.
In addition, we endeavoured to distinguish ourselves from commentators who base their criticisms of the forensic science and reform
aspirations primarily on idealized images of science:
Although our proposed approach to admissibility borrows from
the emphasis on reliability, testing, peer review, publication, the
determination of error rates, and the need for more rigorous gate-keeping
promoted in the Daubert decision (though most conspicuous in civil
proceedings), it differs from the model of science presented in Daubert
and championed by most of the prominent critics of the forensic sciences
by being more contextual. Rather than invoke philosophically driven,
idealized models of science, with which to contrast extant forensic
science and medical practice, our approach is instead grounded in the
specific values and purposes of criminal justice, empirical studies of
experience with Daubert and wrongful convictions, an authoritative
review of the forensic sciences in the United States, and empirically
sensitive approaches to science and expertise drawn from post-Kuhnian
science studies.43
Generally, critics of the forensic sciences have portrayed the Daubert
criteria as an accurate description of the essential ingredients of
authentic (or normal) science and have used such representations to
make pejorative comparisons with institutionalized forensic science and

medicine. 44

There is also a danger that imposing standards based on idealized models
of science-idealization common to Daubert,the forensic science critics,
and now the NAS report-may encourage the generation of exceptions
capable of accommodating many forms of expert-opinion evidence
based on experience, intuitive appeal, or perceived need.45
Our invocation of the Daubertcriteria--or other serviceable criteriato inform the determination of the admissibility of expert opinion evidence
in criminalproceedingswas not intended to idealize science, nor to suggest
that they should be understood as essential indicia of science:

42.
43.
44.
45.

Ibid at 399-400.
Ibid at 346-347. See Acharya, supra note I at 26.
Edmond & Roach, supra note 1 at 368.
Ibid at 373.
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Our proposed approach to admissibility is informed not only by the
values and context of criminal justice but also by the content of the
particular form of expertise that is offered as testimony. This means that
judges and lawyers must not rely solely on the idealized and abstract
vision of proper science implicit in Daubert but should also attend to
the limitations of techniques and the controversies in the particular field
from which the expert evidence derives.46
In the context of the adversarial trial and in response to incriminating
expert evidence, the Daubert criteria, especially testing, can provide,
in many and perhaps most criminal cases, serviceable resources for
approaching the question of whether incriminating expert evidence is
sufficiently reliable to admit. Unlike the mandatory Mohan factorsconcerned with the admissibility of novel expert evidence-the Daubert
criteria are specifically focused on indicia of reliability.47
Instead, it is our contention that such criteria can actually assist in
assessing the probative value of techniques and derivative opinions for
both admissibility and weight.48
Acharya candidly acknowledges some of our concerns and even
reproduces a number of passages and sentences where we explicitly reject
idealized (or essentialist) models of science and expertise. She states:
Although they suggest that the Daubertcriteria are helpful in determining
demonstrable reliability, Edmond and Roach do not subscribe to the
Daubertcourt's notion that the Daubertcriteria are indicative of scientific
reliability, nor its idealized image of science or scientific reliability. ... A
number of elements from Edmond and Roach's route are agreeable. They
fairly point out that "[i]n many ways, the questions of whether Daubert
embodies the essentials of genuine science and whether we can develop
useful means of demarcating science from other types of knowledge
and experience are distractions." I agree. They are distractions because
the relevant concern is not whether evidence is "scientific" or not, so
determining if the Daubert criteria appropriately characterize science is
non-essential. Moreover, as Edmond and Roach imply, expert evidence
should be treated consistently in the legal process whether the evidence
can be labeled scientific or not. That is, "non-science" or "experiencebased" expert evidence ought to be legally reliable just as scientific
expert evidence should.49

46. lbid at 349.
47. Ibid at 400.
48. Consistent with a rigorous approach to the Daubert criteria, the Law Commission's desiderata
in its draft bill, and considerations advanced in Gary Edmond, "Pathological Science? Demonstrable
Reliability and Expert Pathology Evidence" in Kent Roach, ed, PediatricForensic Pathologyand the
Justice System (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2008) 96.
49. Acharya, supra note I at 23-24.
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Moreover, on several occasions Acharya recognizes that we endeavour to
ground our approach to admissibility in accordance with criminal justice
values rather than in (idealized) epistemology or philosophically-driven
models of science. This is perhaps most explicit in the following passage,
reproduced at the beginning of Acharya's discussion of ACA.
It is the importance we ascribe to the presumption of innocence, to
avoiding the conviction of the innocent, the premium placed on fairness
and accuracy, the difficulty of challenging incriminating expert evidence
in the context of the accusatorial criminal trial, along with the very real
limitations of supposed trial safeguards (e.g., warnings to juries), that
encourage us to recommend the imposition of fairly onerous standards
in the determination of whether the state's forensic scientists (and other
experts) should be entitled to express incriminating opinion in the
criminal proceedings."o
Given this recognition, we find it difficult to understand how we could be
considered to be promoting an idealized image of science.
Somewhat ironically, we would contend that it is Acharya who is
the idealist. She offers a method-predicated model of scientific practice
that is inconsistent with the evidence assembled by scholars, particularly
sociologists, historians, and anthropologists, who have actually studied
science in situ following the seminal work of Thomas Kuhn. Moreover,
when discussing the Daubertcriteria she suggests,just as her description of
scientific procedure implies, that they encapsulate the essential ingredients
of science. Notably, the Daubert decision is said to have "marked the
beginning of using scientific criteria to address legal reliability."'
Remarkably, science as Acharya understands it-with its efficacious
(falsificationist) method and commitment to peer review-is not to be used
by courts to assist with admissibility gatekeeping or decision-making.
It is probably a mistake generally, though certainly inappropriate
here, to descend into a detailed discussion of the philosophy of science
when discussing legal practice and reform.5 2 We are not idealists, and
this in part explains, our lack of explicit attention to the philosophy

50. Edmond & Roach, supra note 1 at 403; Acharya, supranote I at 21.
51. Ibid at5.
52. See S Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Adina
Schwartz, "A 'Dogma of Empiricism' Revisited: Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc and
the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v United States" (1997) 10 Hary J L & Tech
149; David Caudill & Richard Redding, "Junk Philosophy of Science? The Paradox of Expertise
and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts" (2000) 57 Wash & Lee L Rev 685; Susan Haack, "An
Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr. Joiner" (2001) 26 J Health Pol
217; D Caudill & L LaRue, No Magic Wand: The Idealizationof Science in the Law (Lantham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).
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of science (or attempts to define science and expertise), or the more
practically informative history, sociology, and anthropology of science.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the philosophy of science, per se,
will necessarily provide practical perspectives on the sciences, with one
important exception. Perhaps the only immediately useful insight which
underpins our consciously empirical approach is the idea that there is
no universal scientific method and no simple demarcation criterion."
Generally accepted by historians, sociologists and philosophers (and many
scientists), the lack of a universal efficacious method means that in many
cases, though particularly in novel areas and in times of controversy, there
is no simple procedural means of determining what is good as opposed to
bad practice or knowledge, and that boundaries around science and nonscientific activities are often flexible and even porous.5 4 These insights
are not grounds for despair, nor do they impair humanistic approaches
to understanding the sciences and expertise." Rather, as we suggested
in ACA, they require legal institutions to seriously reflect upon the
terms on which they engage with exogenous expertise and knowledge.
"Demonstrable reliability" is not an attempt to usurp the autonomy or
independence of law and legal practice. For, lawyers and judges, steeped
in their slowly evolving legal traditions, will need to develop its meaning
through practice.
We also make reference to Daubert,but in a more qualified capacity.
Our promotion of Daubert-style criteria as useful admissibility heuristics
is based on the possibility of forensic scientists (and others) being able to
evaluate their techniques and proficiency empirically.56 Our admissibility
standard places emphasis on empirical assessment and evidence of ability
and error, not because these are necessary elements of all (good) science,
but rather because if the state intends to rely upon techniques and derivative
opinions to support proof then it should be attentive to their value. In
many cases, experimental testing, validation, and proficiency studies will
provide the kinds of information that ought to inform our assessment of
admissibility-as well as the weight to ascribe to expert opinions. We
suggest.that the Daubert criteria, and similar lists (e.g., those associated
53. See Edmond, "Judicial Representations," supra note 38 and Caudill & LaRue, supranote 52.
54. See, e.g., J Schuster & R Yeo, eds, The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Method (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1986); T Gieryn, CulturalBoundaries ofScience: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1998).
55. See, e.g., H Collins & R Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007).
56. We accept that some areas of science and medicine and many areas of non-science will have
difficulty generating empirical evidence, or at least in a form that provides validation or error rates.
We believe that legal institutions can respond sensitively.
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with the Law Commission's draft bill) provide a useful set of resources
to assist with such assessments. These criteria, if applied rigorously, are
reasonably demanding, and are especially suited to determining the utility
of techniques in regular use."
We acknowledge that there will be complex debates around what
levels of accuracy ought to sustain admissibility and what to do about fields
or areas where testing and evaluation is difficult-as in the simmering
controversy around Abbey." There will also be debates about whether the
strength of the case can mediate admissibility. 9 These however should
not prevent a general interest in empirical evidence in most, and perhaps
all, circumstances. Moreover, we contend that demonstrable reliability
does not necessarily undermine traditional legal practice. Rather, a
slightly higher admissibility standard will have a range of system benefits
regardless of whether it is applied asymmetrically or symmetrically.
The invocation of "demonstrable reliability" in the realm of criminal
justice is intended to focus more attention on admissibility decision-making
and exclusion. It is also intended to provide a beacon to investigators,
forensic scientists, and lawyers. Historical admissibility practice has
produced a range of undesirable practices and quasi-knowledges. Liberal
admissibility standards make forensic scientists less inclined to study or
improve their techniques, and techniques that are unreliable or speculative
tend to be admitted and relied upon to support guilt.
II. The poverty offormalism (and the needfor engagement)
Both fields.. .are able to produce legitimate outcomes through adherence
60
to procedure.
Acharya places considerable emphasis and reliance on "legitimacy
through adherence to procedure."" She accepts that accuracy in factfinding is fundamental to legal practice but has a tendency to excuse
factual error, given conditions of uncertainty.62 We accept that there can
be uncertainty, but our concerns are restricted to forensic science and
57. The NAS report generally supports this approach. See Law Commission of England and Wales,
supra note 2.
58. Compare our respective positions: Edmond & Roach, supra note 1 at 391-395; Acharya, supra
note 1 at 24-25. See also Rv Aitken, 2012 BCCA 134.
59. Though we would contend that the strength of the case should not mediate the admissibility
of incriminating expert opinion evidence, especially if the analysts knew about prejudicial or
incriminating evidence that was not relevant to their analyses.
60. Acharya, supranote 1 at 7, 10.
61. Ibidat3.
62. See B Campbell, "Uncertainty as symbolic action in disputes among experts" (1985) 15 Soc
Stud Sci 429.
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medicine, and particularly techniques in regular use. We believe that
insufficient attention to the reliability of incriminating expert opinions
contributes to substantial unfairness and increases the risk of error-and
often obscures the extent of (un)certainty. The kinds of excuses invoked by
Acharya-"the need for timely dispute resolution, economic constraints,
and numerous sources of error that exist within the adjudicative process"are not particularly applicable to forensic sciences in routine use. 63 In our
view, the state has the resources and abilities to evaluate forensic science
and medicine techniques and should do so where it relies on derivative
expert opinion evidence.
Acharya's commentary risks privileging form over substance. Without
trivializing the importance of facts or factual accuracy, Acharya consistently
affirms the primacy of legal rules and procedures. This enables her to
declare that: "[t]he legitimacy of adjudicative outcomes is not dependent
on consistency with actual reality."' We do not share this approach. For
us, legal rules and procedures are designed to achieve particular endsends driven by criminal justice aspirations and principles. They should be
designed and operate in ways that produce factually accurate outcomes so
that the innocent are not convicted. These commitments have very long
legacies in both commentary (often associated with Jeremy Bentham,
and Hale and Blackstone, respectively) and case law. We accept that
procedures are important, as is their consistent application, though it is
our contention that the main goal of the criminal trial is "to do justice in
the pursuit of truth."65 Acharya has reified legal procedures and allowed
rules and procedures to rise above their purpose(s). Adjectival rules are to
facilitate the ends of justice, they are not an end in themselves.
While willing to acknowledge the importance of procedure, we are far
from persuaded that "following procedural rules maintains the legitimacy
of adjudicative decisions, even if some substantive wrong occurs. "66
Whereas Acharya is content to accept that "legal facts-generated through
conventional legal processes-might be inconsistent with "reality" or
"scientific knowledge," we are far less comfortable.
What is problematic, however, is an under-emphasis on procedural
legitimacy, or the notion that consistent adherence to legal procedure is
essential to maintaining legitimate adjudicative outcomes. Procedural
legitimacy acknowledges that adjudicative outcomes are made in
conditions of factual uncertainty, so it is inevitable that from time to
63. Acharya, supra note I at 10.
64. Ibid at 14.
65. Ho, supra note 4.
66. Acharya, supra note 1 at 3.
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time, a legal fact will not correspond with factual reality, and an
adjudicative outcome will be inconsistent with what really happened
in fact. Given these circumstances, adherence to legal procedure
ensures legitimate adjudicative outcomes. Considering the significance
of consistent adherence to legal procedure, an under-emphasis on
procedural legitimacy in preference for substantive concerns can result
in inappropriate procedural compromise. ...consistent application
of legal procedure is significant in maintaining the legitimacy of the
adjudicative system generally, as well as the legitimacy of individual
legal outcomes."
To the extent possible, while maintaining a civil society and fair
procedures, we would aim for equilibration between the "two" domains.6 1
However, we would also place emphasis on the need to avoid certain types
of discrepancies in criminal justice practice. Where a person is imprisoned
and the evidence seems to suggest real doubts about their guilt or
indicates innocence, we are not satisfied by "legal facts" derived through
procedurally regular processes. To the extent that the system is unwilling
to rectify such anomalies, outcomes are illegitimate and inconsistent with
espoused criminal justice principles.
We believe that legal practice should, as far as possible, draw upon
scientific knowledge and insights.69 Apart from our non-idealist approach,
our concerns are directed to stimulating improved engagement with the
sciences and scientific knowledge. We are also trying to maintain law's
social legitimacy by enhancing its performance relative to espoused
goals. We doubt that legal institutions can maintain, let alone enhance,
their legitimacy without developing improved means of engaging with
(exogenous) knowledges from beyond the law. This will involve reforming
rules and processes, ongoing assessment of law reform, and continuing
dialogues with other knowledge traditions. In advanced Western
democracies, legal institutions cannot afford to make decisions that are
"contrary to scientific knowledge" and there can be no social or political
legitimacy if legal outcomes are not consistently indexed to culturally
dominant epistemologies. When it comes to incriminating expert opinions,
67. Ibidat28.
68. Without wanting to embark on a detailed discussion, the forensic sciences represent an interesting
example of how law, science, and investigators have historically co-produced a range of legally relevant
knowledge and practices. The question is whether this co-production has been effective or, as many
commentators suggest, might have generated a range of undesirable, or pathological, knowledges and
practices. On co-production see S Jasanoff, ed, States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science
and Social Order (London: Routledge, 2006).
69. Gary Edmond, "Bacon's chickens? Re-thinking law and science (and incriminating expert
opinion evidence) in response to empirical evidence and legal principle" in J Gleeson & R Higgins,
eds, Constituting Law: LegalArgument andSocial Values (Sydney: Federation Press, 2011).
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the need to pay attention to what scientists say and what goes on beyond
the court is acute, even if it will not necessarily dictate the precise shape
of legal procedures or particular outcomes. Legal institutions are not, and
cannot claim to be, autonomous from scientific communities or society
more generally.70
III. The illegitimacy of wrongfid convictions
As suggested above, a foundational point in Acharya's provocative
article is the proposition that inaccurate results reached in legal systems
retain their legitimacy if they follow legitimate procedural rules. In her
words: "the legitimacy of resultant legal determination is dependent on
whether the appropriate procedures were adhered to during the decisionmaking process"" and "adherence to legal procedure ensures legitimate
adjudicative outcomes."72 She stresses that the reasonable doubt standard
used in criminal law ensures the legitimacy of procedural rules even
when they produce wrongful convictions. 73 We disagree with this starting
point. More importantly, we think that healthy legal systems must and do
disagree with the idea that procedurally regular wrongful convictions do
not undermine the legitimacy of criminal justice outcomes. In our view,
the reality of wrongful convictions requires reform of procedural rules
including rules concerning the admissibility of forensic scientific evidence
when that evidence has contributed to convicting and imprisoning innocent
people.
In terms of legal practice we begin with what the Supreme Court of
Canada has said on this issue. In one of its early Charter cases, it declared
that "[i]t has from time immemorial been part of our system of laws that
the innocent not be punished. This principle has long been recognized as
an essential element of a system for the administration of justice which is
founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of the human person and
on the rule of law."74 In United States ofAmerica v Burns and Rafay, the
Supreme Court cited David Milgaard's wrongful conviction as an example
of how "a fair trial does not always guarantee a safe verdict."7 Far from
suggesting that such wrongful convictions remained legitimate because

70. See, e.g., Gary Edmond, "The law-set: The legal-scientific production of medical propriety"
(2001) 26 Sci Techn & Hum Val 191.
71. Acharya, supra note I at 14.
72. Ibidat28.
73. Ibid at 12. See R v Starr, [2000] 2 SCR 144 on the need for the reasonable doubt standard to be
situated much closer to absolute certainty than a balance of probabilities.
74. Reference re BC Motor Vehicles Act, [1985]2 SCR 486 at para 69.
75. United States of America v Burns and Rafay, [2001] 1 SCR 283 at para 98 [Burns and Rafay]
[emphasis in original].
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of the fairness of the trial, the Court in that case used emerging evidence
about the prevalence of wrongful convictions as a reason to change its
traditional rule that allowed fugitives to be extradited to face the death
penalty. Burns and Rafay has rightly been hailed as one of the most
important decisions under the Charter. Its reliance on new evidence and its
willingness to change position suggests that in some contexts, the law can
evolve in ways that are sympathetic to exogenous developments.16 These
cases in our view refute the idea that procedurally regular convictions
of the innocent do not undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system. A legal system that based its claim to legitimacy on following
rules, as proposed by Acharya, would tend to be static and reluctant toperhaps incapable of-reform."
There is ample global evidence that known wrongful convictions
undermine the legitimacy of criminal justice systems. In the United
Kingdom, a series of wrongful convictions following Irish terrorist attacks
led to reforms that eventually led to the creation of the Criminal Cases
Review Commission. Most states in the United States have enacted
DNA testing legislation and a few have reconsidered the death penalty in
light of widespread revelations of wrongful convictions. Even China has
responded to a few notorious murder convictions-where the victim was
subsequently discovered to be alive-with reforms to its criminal justice
system. These include stronger commitment to review in death penalty
cases and proposals for more exclusion of illegally obtained evidence."
The Goudge Inquiry, appropriately praised by Acharya, is also an
example of how known wrongful convictions affect the legitimacy of
the justice system. The Goudge Inquiry was in part appointed because of
the William Mullins-Johnson case in which a man served twelve years in
prison following his wrongful conviction for the sexual assault and murder
76. A similar pattern is also seen in Rv Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 SCR 326, where the Supreme Court
articulated a broad new rule that the prosecutor must disclose all relevant evidence to the accused
before the trial in reaction to evidence about how a lack of disclosure contributed to the wrongful
conviction of Donald Marshall Jr and recommendations that Parliament adopt a new disclosure regime
made in the Royal Commission on the Donald MarshallJr Prosecution (Halifax: Queen's Printer of
Ontario, 1989).
77. For something of a reactionary defence of the existing system, and opposition to our demonstrable
reliability proposal, see Ken Chasse, "Comment: 'Junk Science' by Way of a Higher Burden of Proof'
(2012) 16 Can Crim Law Rev 323 and our reply Gary Edmond & Kent Roach "Comment-A Reply to
Chasse's 'Junk Science by Way of a Higher Burden of Proof'(2012) 16 Can Crim Law Rev 391. Note
however that in his reply to our reply, Chasse asserts that he is concerned with wrongful convictions.
Ken Chasse "Comment-Conceding to the Edmond-Roach Reply" (2012) 16 Can Crim Law Rev 381.
78. Wu Xiaofeng "An Analysis of Wrongful Convictions in China" (2011) 36 Okla City U L Rev
451 at 466; Kandis Scott "Why did China Reform its Death Penalty?" (2010) 19 Pac Rim L & Pol'y
J 63 at 72-74; Margaret K Lewis "Controlling Abuse to Maintain Control: The Exclusionary Rule in
China" (2011) 43 NYU Int'l L & Pol 629 at 668-672.

Trial by Theory: A Response to Acharya's
"Law's Treatment of Science"

75

of his four-year-old niece. Prosecutors and courts have subsequently and
rightly apologized to Mr. Mullins-Johnson."9 There was no suggestion that
his conviction had no effect on the legitimacy of the criminal justice system
simply because it followed orthodox procedures. Indeed, expert witnesses
were heard from both sides at trial and there has been no suggestion that
any of the experts in that case should not have been allowed to testify
under the-"procedurally legitimate"-liberal admissibility standards
that applied at the time. Mullins-Johnson's conviction was overturned
not on the basis of procedural error but new evidence that cast doubt on
the forensic pathology evidence offered by the Crown. Other wrongful
convictions in Dr. Smith cases have been overturned despite arising from
original decisions by the accused to plead guilty. This again demonstrates
that procedural regularity cannot legitimate the conviction of the
innocent.s0 The wrongful convictions stemming from the testimony of Dr.
Charles Smith undermined the legitimacy of the criminal justice system in
Ontario. Indeed one of the main articulated purposes of Justice Goudge's
public inquiry and report was an attempt to restore public confidence in
the justice system.8 '
Acharya's claim that the legitimacy of legal outcomes depends
simply on whether appropriate legal procedures have been followed is not
supported by the evidence about how the world reacts when confronted
with a known wrongful conviction regardless of the procedural regularity
of the process that produced it. It also suggests that law may be "more
dedicated to empirical truth" than she implies.82 On this basis we accept
Acharya's claim that our proposal that forensic science evidence introduced
by the Crown should be demonstrably reliable is "an attempt to restore
some legitimacy to the criminal trial process." 3 We would, however,
suggest that this is true of almost all responses to wrongful convictions
including the recommendations following the Goudge Inquiry and recent
jurisprudential refinements by the Supreme Court of Canada.

79. R v Mullins-Johnson, 2007 ONCA 720.
80. Ibid. For cases where wrongful convictions initially obtained by guilty pleas were overturned in
Dr Smith cases see: R v Sheratt Robinson, 2009 ONCA 886; R v CF, 2010 ONCA 691; R v CM, 2010
ONCA 690; R v Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120; R v Brant, 2011 ONCA 362.
81. "My recommendations are designed to restore and enhance public confidence in pediatric
forensic pathology and its future use in the criminal justice system": Goudge Inquiry, supranote 2 at
437. See also at 541 and recommendation 145 noting that some of the independent and investigative
attributes of the Criminal Cases Review Commission could "assist in enhancing public confidence."
See also at 589 noting that a broad range of actors, including courts, have a role to play in protecting
the public against flawed forensic pathology.
82. Acharya, supra note I at 15.
83. Ibid at 26.
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IV. Acceptable error or wrongful conviction rates in the criminaljustice
system?
As Acharya astutely notes, there are some significant differences between
the Goudge Inquiry's proposal that the trial judge impose threshold
reliability standards on all expert evidence and our proposal for an
asymmetrical demonstrable reliability standard with respect to forensic
science evidence presented by the Crown. But she presents the differences
as categorical differences on the basis that we, but not the Goudge Inquiry,
believe that wrongful convictions risk undermining the legitimacy
of the justice system. Here we must disagree. As suggested above, the
Goudge Inquiry, like the Supreme Court of Canada, accepts that wrongful
convictions have the potential to undermine legal legitimacy. The almost
universal horror with which people greet known wrongful convictions
is simply too strong to suggest that wrongful convictions can be seen as
legitimate because proper procedures were followed.
What then explains the difference between our demonstrable reliability
proposals and the less radical threshold reliability proposals of the Goudge
Inquiry? Roach, in prior writings, has argued that a useful distinction
can be drawn between the illegitimacy and unacceptability of known or
even suspected wrongful convictions in individual cases and the systemic
error rate of the criminal justice system.' Here Acharya's concerns that
proposals such as ours may have unacceptable effects on the operation
of the criminal justice system despite their laudable goal of preventing
wrongful convictions have a very respected theoretical pedigree. Both Lon
Fuller" and Ronald Dworkin, 6 legal theorists associated with respect for
individual rights, have separately argued that even though the accused as
an individual has a right not to be convicted of a crime that he or she did
not commit, there is no right to the most accurate criminal justice system
(or expert opinion evidence) possible." For example, Dworkin has argued
that even if it could be demonstrated that a significantly expanded jury
would produce fewer wrongful convictions this does not mean all accused
would have a right to such an expanded jury." The truth of this insight is
also underlined by the reductio ad absurdum that the best way to prevent
wrongful convictions is to have no convictions at all.
84. Kent Roach, "The Protection of Innocence under Section 7 of the Charter" (2006) 34 Sup Ct L
Rev 2d 249 at 255-259.
85. Lon Fuller, The Morality ofLaw, 2d ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), at 179-180.
86. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) at
note 72.
87. See Gary Edmond & Andrew Roberts, "Procedural Fairness, the Criminal Trial and Forensic
Science and Medicine" (2011) 33 Sydney L Rev 359.
88. Dworkin, supranote 86 at 88.
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Viewed in this light, the difference between our demonstrable reliability
standard and the more modest, albeit still reformist recommendations
made by the Goudge Inquiry can be seen as involving empirical claims
about the effects of alternative reforms on the functioning of the criminal
justice system and about acceptable error rates within that system. Acharya
suggests that the Goudge Inquiry proposals are more acceptable than ours
because they can more easily be reconciled with R v Mohan. 9 We fail to
understand why Mohan is the decisive point of reference. The Goudge
Inquiry recognized that a number of subsequent decisions, including R
v J(LJ)90 and R v Trochym,9 ' placed important glosses on the Mohan test
with the former moving Mohan closer to Daubert and the latter relating
unknown reliability of post-hypnosis testimony to the risk of wrongful
convictions. In any event, the important point here is that even the standards
recommended by Justice Goudge contemplate exclusion of some expert
evidence on grounds that it does not satisfy "threshold reliability." Such
exclusions, like potentially more frequent exclusions under our proposal,
could increase what Acharya calls "wrongful acquittals" and perhaps harm
social interests in the control and deterrence of crime.
Acharya suggests that our proposals do not give sufficient weight to
"the protection of society, prevention of false acquittals, or deterrence of
crime" 92 and "interfere with the rules governing admissibility of evidence
by making it harder for the Crown to meet its burden of proof."93 These may
be practical outcomes but if so, they would be symptoms of our proposal
rather than its motivation. They are ultimately empirical questions. In
our view, existing evidence about high conviction rates94 and the lack
of evidence about the connection between convictions and the existence
and deterrence of crime in society makes it unlikely that our admissibility
standard would significantly harm these values. 5 But a similar though
perhaps unquantifiably lower risk also accompanies the Goudge Inquiry
proposals that Acharya praises. Both our and the Goudge Inquiry proposals

89. [1994] 2 SCR 9 [Mohan].
90. [2000] 2 SCR 600 [JLJJ.
91. [2007] 1 SCR 239 [Trochym].
92. Acharya, supranote I at 26.
93. Ibid at 27.
94. About two-thirds of adult criminal cases result in convictions over the last decade with most
of the other cases being withdrawn by the Crown. Only three per cent result in acquittals. Juristat,
"Adult Criminal Court Statistics 2010-2011" at 10, online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.
gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/I l646-eng.pdf>.
95. Canadian Sentencing Commission, SentencingReform: A CanadianApproach (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer of Ontario, 1987) at ch 6.
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are reform processes focused on the rules of admissibility.9 6 The existence
of the reasonable doubt standard does not, as Acharya suggests, insulate
admissibility rules from. legal reform in an attempt to respond to the
injustice of wrongful convictions. Nor should it.
V. Over-relianceon trial safeguardsand the standardofproof
One of the factors motivating our proposal for reform was emerging
evidence about the frailty of contemporary practice, particularly trial
safeguards and the burden and standard of proof. Along with many judges,
Acharya maintains confidence in the efficacy and sufficiency of trial
safeguards (e.g., cross-examination, rebuttal experts, directions, warnings
and the burden and standard of proof), professional obligations (bar rules
and codes of conduct) and appellate review.97 In ACA (and elsewhere)
we questioned this confidence. Reinforced by personal experience,
developments in the aftermath of Innocence Projects and recent revelations
concerning problems with many types of forensic science and medicine,
we suggested that trial safeguards-whether operating individually or in
combination-do not consistently or systematically expose limitations
with incriminating expert opinion evidence.9 8 In consequence, they do not
necessarily assist with the evaluation of evidence, do not necessarily afford
protection to the accused, and do not assure procedural fairness. They are
more inconsistent and generally less effective than credible safeguards
could claim to be. Moreover, liberal admissibility practice and allowing
the tribunal of fact to allocate "weight" to factually weak and speculative
opinions-regardless of what transpires at trial-threaten the theoretically
onerous standard of proof.
Acharya's commitments can be observed in her treatment of the burden
and standard of proof. This discussion assumes a rather abstract form based
around an example that equates the criminal standard of proof-beyond
reasonable doubt-with ninety-five per cent. Adhering to this formalistic
model, Acharya implies that the accused should be acquitted where proof
ranges "anywhere from 0-94%" and convicted where ninety-five per cent
or higher. She continues:

96. Justice Goudge's terms of reference and recommendations were more broadly oriented than
admissibility.
97. See Gary Edmond & Mehera San Roque, "The Cool Crucible: Forensic Science and the Frailty
of the Criminal Trial" (2012) 24 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 51. On prosecutorial performance,
see D Medwed, ProsecutionComplex: America s Race to Convict and its Impact on the Innocent (New
York: NYU Press, 2012).
98. Here we are referring to our experience with the Goudge Inquiry and Edmond's qualitative
ethnographic study of expert evidence in Australian courts, along with our considerable experience
with expert reports and appellate court decisions.
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... if there is an error, it is much more likely to fall on the side of notguilty than guilty, because if an accused is found guilty, there should
only be a 5% chance that the accused is actually innocent. It is much
more likely that the accused is erroneously found to be not-guilty than
erroneouslyfound to be guilty. The risk of error is therefore distributed,
largely in favour of the accused."
We accept that in theory proof is structured to protect the accused from
wrongful conviction. Our concern is that the burden of proof may provide
insufficient protection, especially when it comes to unreliable and
speculative forensic science and medicine evidence. This is especially so
when that evidence is, as it was in the Dr. Smith cases, offered on the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.
There are, in Acharya's invocation of proof as the dominant legal
safeguard, no references to research literatures or studies which suggest
that the standard of proof in criminal proceedings operates in the formal
way she suggests. 00 Perhaps the leading psychologically-based model
involves fact-finders assessing evidence in terms of the most persuasive
narrative-the so-called story model."o' On this approach, it is not entirely
clear that the standard of proof is particularly instructive in evaluating
the most plausible story. The fact that the defence quite regularly fails to
call much evidence, let alone advance a counter-narrative, means that the
presumption of innocence may have a rhetorical salience-in line with
a long formal tradition-but more limited practical value. Placing the
burden of proof on the state and not requiring a response have laudable
purposes. Nevertheless, the accused is still vulnerable to conviction if he
or she does not offer a counter-narrative, especially in cases where the
weight of science is added to the authority of the state's case.102
Another example of the confidence invested in rules and their
application concerns judges (not) excluding expert opinion evidence
where the prejudicial effect of evidence outweighs it probative value.
Acharya places emphasis on this admissibility rule/safeguard as part of her

99. Acharya, supra note 1 at 12.
100. Again, this has similarities with Laudan's neo-Benthamite preference for admission of all
relevant evidence (sometimes described as free or naturalproof) and reliance on the burden and high
standard of criminal proof.
101. N Pennington & R Hastie, "Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the story model for juror decision
making" (1992) 62 J Pers Soc Psychol 189, discussed in Gary Edmond & David Hamer, "Evidence
Law" in P Cane & H Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of EmpiricalLegal Research (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
102. See Emma Cunliffe, Murder Medicine and Motherhood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) for a
compelling demonstration that the conviction of an Australian woman, Kathleen Folbigg, of killing
her four infants, did not satisfy the legal standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
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discussion of "procedural legitimacy."o 3 Ironically, this example illustrates
the importance of demonstrable evidence of reliability. Without empirical
evidence about ability and accuracy oftechniques, how are we to determine
probative value (or the danger of unfair prejudice)?" The danger of unfair
prejudice will be acute where the opinion appears or is represented as
probative but might not be-that is, where it is unreliable or speculative.
There is no evidence that epistemic limitations are systematically, or
even routinely, identified and conveyed at trial. Similarly, there is no
evidence that safeguards such as cross-examination, rebuttal experts and
judicial directions effectively moderate the interpretation of incriminating
opinions. Low admissibility standards and indifference to actual reliability
(i.e., probative value) tend to undermine proof and may actually impose
a reverse burden, perversely requiring the accused to demonstrate that
incriminating opinions adduced by the state are not reliable. 0
Interestingly, having noted our concerns about the prevalence of
unreliable and speculative forensic science and medicine evidence,
Acharya never responds. We can only assume that the faith she invests in
procedural propriety, trial safeguards and especially the standard of proof,
affords adequate protection to the accused from unreliable and speculative
expert opinions.106
VI. Asymmetry and modular approaches to expertise
Our concern with both criminal justice aspirations and values and practice
led us to advance an asymmetrical approach to admissibility in criminal
proceedings and to suggest that legal values and practical needs rather
than idealized (or essentialized) models of science should be driving
admissibility standards and their application.
1. Asymmetry
Our support for an asymmetrical approach to admissibility cuts several
ways. First, our non-idealized approach to expertise means that we do not
(and did not) commit to extending demonstrable reliability to other legal
domains relying upon expertise. ACA was expressly restricted to the realm
of criminal justice. Secondly, and more controversially for Acharya, we
express support for an asymmetrical approach to admissibility between the
state and the accused. Not only do we believe that this embodies criminal
103. Acharya, supranote 1 at 4.
104. See, for example, the discussion in Dupas v The Queen, [2012] VSCA 328 around the probative
value/unfair prejudice discretion.
105. Gary Edmond, "Specialised knowledge, the exclusionary discretions and reliability: Reassessing
incriminating expert opinion evidence" (2008) 31 UNSWLJ 1.
106. Acharya, supranote I at 21 note 60.
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justice values, but in many ways it reflects common law thinking-if not
always practice. 107Historically, accusatorial systems have been interested
in the factual guilt of the accused and, in general, have endeavoured to
accommodate evidence supporting non-guilt or innocence-especially at
trial.
One way to defuse the apparently (or allegedly) disruptive nature
of our proposal is to contrast it with actual practice in recent years. In
many cases the state was allowed to call upon highly credentialled and/or
experienced forensic scientists (and physicians) to express their speculative
opinions about issues closely related to guilt. We recommend that such
opinions should not be admitted unless there are good reasons to believe
(on the balance of probabilities) that they are demonstrably reliable. We
would, however, allow the accused to adduce expert opinion evidence that
might not be demonstrably reliable. This would not become a free-forall. Expert witnesses called by the defence would have to satisfy some
standard pertaining to qualifications and experience, and maybe even offer
some reason to think their opinions possess significant (i.e., non-trivial)
probative value. Here it seems salient to remind our critics that in practice,
the state did little more than this for over a century. Such a concession
would enable those accused who can identify and afford an expert able
to credibly opine on a relevant issue, a reasonable opportunity to have
evidence consistent with their non-guilt heard. Moreover, to prevent the
accused having some kind of tactical advantage, we explained that in the
few cases where the accused calls an expert to offer primary evidence the
state could respond in kind. 10 That is, expert witnesses responding to this
evidence would not have to satisfy the demonstrable reliability standard.
These modifications involve tweaking a small part of a large system.
Admittedly controversial, if introduced they would not undermine the
procedural legitimacy of criminal proceedings. Rather, they would create
a new equilibrium where what counted as procedurally legitimate was
slightly modified. Because we do not maintain essentialized models of
science and law, and believe that the manner in which criminal justice
principles should find expression is interpretively open, this does not
constitute a problem for us.

107. This was exemplified in the Law Commission's recent report, see supra note 2 at 3.82-3.84.
108. We accept that psychiatric evidence might be an exception, but the state is well positioned to
counter such evidence, and there are longstanding problems with legal approaches to mental illness,
normalcy and responsibility.
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2. Modularity
In ACA, as part of our response to science and expertise, we indicated that
judges should develop evidence jurisprudence in ways that are consistent
with principle and simultaneously improve practice. Because our approach
to admissibility is responsive to legal principles, extant practice, and
insights from the history, philosophy and sociology of science, we are able
to support a modular approach to expertise.
Recognition that there is no proper model or universal ingredient
applicable to all the activities that might be described as science (let
alone expertise) provides judges with opportunities and simultaneously
obligations to develop adjectival law in more socially responsible and
epistemologically legitimate ways. Judges can, for example, develop
models of expertise that are tailored to and embody legal values and
principles and take into account experience with wrongful convictions
and a broad-based critique of forensic science and medicine.'09
These ideas have subsequently been developed in other writings.
While it would be unfair to expect Acharya to be conversant with recent

publications, the sentiments expressed in them are consistent with those
advanced in our original article."o In this explanatory context they bear
repeating:
... legal models of expertise should be shaped primarily by legal principle
and system goals. That is, they should be more modular, indexed to: the
participants; the type of proceeding; the type of expertise; the broader
socio-political purposes of different types of institutions and activities,
as well as what we actually know about technical capabilities.
Once we recognize that expertise can be described in a variety of nonessential ways we can begin to reflect upon attributes that might be
considered desirable in particular legal contexts. That is, we can begin
to think about tailoring models of expertise and admissibility criteria to
achieve or uphold specific socio-legal values and objectives. By way of
example, the model of expertise governing admissibility and proof might

be quite different in a system that values crime control over accuracy
and/or fairness. Similar considerations arise in the civil sphere when we
factor in the resources of the parties and a range of regulatory aspirations
associated with risk, deterrence and compensation.

109. Edmond & Roach, supra note I at 404.
110. Gary Edmond, "Advice for the Courts? Sufficiently Reliable Assistance with Forensic Science
and Medicine (Part 2)" (2012) 16 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 263 [Edmond, "Advice
for the Courts?"].
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A demanding model of expertise-one, for example, that inflexibly
incorporates most (or all) of the Daubertcriteria or their proposed English
'equivalents' might be desirable when determining the admissibility
and weight of a type of incriminating expert opinion evidence that is
routinely adduced by the state. Forensic science techniques, particularly
those used routinely, should be able to satisfy quite onerous admissibility
criteria. Not because these criteria embody authentic (or proper or good
or real and so on) science or its essential attributes, or even reliability
for all times and places, but rather because legal values, the epistemic
weakness of many forensic sciences, and emerging evidence about the
frailty of the adversarial trial, all suggest that unreliable expert evidence
subverts criminal trial principles and objectives. In the context of
criminal justice, imposing (and enforcing) reliability-based admissibility
standards fulfills a pragmatic function more consistent with the premium
placed on factual rectitude and the practical difficulty of overcoming
incriminating, but unreliable, expert opinion evidence.
Onerous admissibility 'criteria might be less well suited to civil
proceedings and regulatory settings. Where, for example, an
impecunious plaintiff alleges that a pharmaceutical caused a debilitating
injury, it might be inappropriate to burden that individual (or 'group')
with proof if the drug has not been adequately tested, or only tested by
private research organizations engaged by the manufacturer through
clinical trials designed to facilitate regulatory approval. Strictly applying
Daubert-style reliability criteria and privileging pre-litigation research,
for example, makes it difficult for plaintiffs to prove injury and loss.
It might also undermine civil justice and regulatory objectives such as
deterring potentially dangerous activities and products as well as provide
manufacturers with incentives not to sponsor independent safety and
efficacy studies. Simultaneously, it transfers the risks of uncertainty,
inaction, under-compensation and malfeasance from manufacturers
(and employers) to a range of other publics. By accepting uncritically
the nature of science, or treating definitions of expertise as effectively
neutral, many of these important (and contested) issues from our civil,
criminal and regulatory systems risk elision or displacement."'

11l. Extracted from Edmond, "Advice for the Courts?," ibid at 294-295. Compare Peter Huber,
Galileo s Revenge: Judging Science in the Courtroom (New York: Basic Books, 1993) Kenneth R
Foster & Peter W Huber, JudgingScience: Scientific Knowledge and the FederalCourts (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1999) in W Wagner & R Steinzor, eds, Rescuing Science from Politics: Regulation
and the Distortionof Scientific Research(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); C Cranor,
Toxic Torts: Science, Law and the PossibilityofJustice (CUP, Cambridge 2006); L Finley, "Guarding
the gate to the courthouse: How trial judges are using their evidentiary screening role to remake tort
causation rules" (1999) 49 DePaul L Rev 335.
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Sensitive to espoused legal values and principles, we deliberately
distinguished civil and criminal justice systems. 112 Of interest, it may be
that the actual goals and principles pertaining to criminal justice are more
readily identified and less controversial, at least in the abstract, than the
goals, values and purposes underpinning the many and varied realms of
civil justice."'
VII. Empiricalevidence?
One conspicuous difference between our respective approaches, and
presumably that enables Acharya to defend the status quo, concerns our
respective responses to empirical evidence. Although she does not discuss
it, Acharya seems wedded to judicially-driven reform-perhaps part of
the legal method-as part of the system's legitimacy and ability to remain
imperviousness to exogenous facts. We, in marked contrast, are interested
in evidence and perspectives that can inform our understanding of legal
performance in both individual cases (e.g., Innocence Projects) or more
systemically (e.g., the Goudge Inquiry and the Law Commission). We are
also interested in what peak scientific bodies or independent committees
have to say about forensic science and medicine evidence used by courts
(e.g., the NAS report).
This is not the place to reproduce our evidence, but rather an opportunity
to affirm the need to attend to sustained evidence and authoritative criticism
of legal practice. In this context it is instructive to make a point in relation
to fingerprint evidence that reinforces problems with contemporary legal
practice as well as Acharya's defence of it. The example illustrates how
legal legitimacy is likely to be eroded, to the extent that judges and expert
witnesses disregard the consensual advice of leading commentators and
peak scientific organizations.
In the aftermath of the NAS report there have been two prominent
inquiries into the use of fingerprints for purposes of identification. The
first, an investigation conducted by Lord Campbell-The Fingerprint
Inquiry-into problems with latent fingerprint evidence in Scotland
following the notorious McKie case, and the second by the Expert
Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis (EWGHF)-a
large multidisciplinary collective sponsored by the United States National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute
112. Edmond's earlier work on tort and product liability was critical of the Daubert criteria as an
accurate (and adequate) description of science. Individually, and with David Mercer, he argued that the
Daubertcriteria tended to be onerous and were not necessarily well suited to legal practice, especially
admissibility decision-making in tort and product liability litigation.
113. See also Gary Edmond & Mehera San Roque, "Just(,) quick and cheap" in M Legg, ed, The
Future of DisputeResolution (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013) at 72-83.
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of Justice (NIJ)." 4 Simultaneously, the first ever validation studies of
fingerprint expertise were undertaken."' Fortunately, the validation
studies affirmed that fingerprint examiners had formidable abilities at
matching and discriminating between fragmentary and reference prints
when their performance was compared to lay persons. This might, by
way of understatement, be considered to be something of a relief for both
the examiners and the many legal systems that have confidently relied
on opinions about fingerprints as identification evidence for more than a
century."6 However, the validation studies and reports, recognized that
the performance of highly trained and experienced examiners was not
errorfree. The validation studies suggest that rates of error are not trivial
and the two reports both recommend that fingerprint examiners should
abandon equating a declared match with positive identification-so-called
individualization. Two, of the considerable number of recommendations
flowing from the reports, include the following:
Recommendation 3: Examiners should discontinue reporting
conclusions on identification or exclusion with a claim to 100% certainty
or on any other basis suggesting that fingerprint evidence is infallible.'"
Recommendation 3.7: Because empirical evidence and statistical
reasoning do not support a source attribution to the exclusion of all other
individuals in the world, latent print examiners should not report or
testify, directly or by implication, to a source attribution to the exclusion
of all others in the world."
This example is interesting because it affirms that even basically
reliable techniques, such as the ability to match and discriminate between
prints and partial prints, are routinely being misrepresented in courts.
Some examiners, according to these recent reports, continue to testify in
absolute terms, continue to trivialize the risk of error, and improperly leap
from a match to identification. Revealingly, limitations with fingerprint
evidence were not identified by the courts and were not unilaterally
114. Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, Latent PrintExamination and
Human Factors:Improving the Practicethrough a Systems Approach (US Department of Commerce,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012) [EWGHF, Latent print examinationand human
factors]; Campbell, The FingerprintInquiry, supranote 2.
115. J Tangen, M Thompson & D McCarthy, "Identifying fingerprint expertise" (2011) 22 Psych Sci
995; B Ulery et al, "Accuracy and reliability of forensic latent fingerprint decisions" (2011) 108 PNAS
7733.
116. It also suggests that the use of empirical evidence, consistent with demonstrable reliability, will
not necessarily lead to wholesale exclusion or open the floodgates to so-called "wrongful acquittals."
It may actually be consistent with high conviction rates.
117. Campbell, The FingerprintInquiry,supra note 2 at 37.
118. EWGHF, Latent print examinationand humanfactors,supra note 114 at 207-210.
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conceded by fingerprint examiners. This example suggests that current
legal practices, and perhaps even more onerous admissibility standards,
may not pay sufficient attention to actual evidence of reliability and will
tend to reinforce the status quo, even where longstanding practice has
many serious, if unappreciated, problems. Significantly, there are good
reasons to believe that fingerprint comparison evidence is much more
reliable than other kinds of comparisons involving: teeth and bite marks;
persons in images; voices and sounds; shoe and foot prints; gait; hair;
ballistics, tool marks; handwriting and documents; blood spatter and so on.
Rigorously applied, demonstrable reliability has the benefit of requiring
those proffering opinions to provide evidence that techniques are reliable.
Such evidence would often have the additional advantage of providing an
indication of the error rate thereby informing the way expert opinions are
expressed and evaluated.
It is our contention that lawyers and judges cannot simply ignore the
NAS report or similar reports emerging in its wake. We must understand
the legal use of incriminating expert opinion evidence in terms of what
scientists (including psychologists) tell us about the value of the evidence,
appropriate forms of expression and the ability of lay persons to credibly
evaluate it. Legal practice, to the extent that it is concerned with accuracy,
fairness and legitimacy cannot afford to disregard these insights and
cannot disregard the critical interventions of peak scientific organizations.
VIII. Reforming a "procedurallylegitimate" system
Acharya contemplates and indeed appears to accept the possibility of
reform in ways that are consistent with "procedural legitimacy." For
example, she suggests that:
...the utility of the adversarial process should be appreciated and
enhanced rather than altered with a view to better accommodate science.
The enhancement can be facilitated by: providing experts with codes of
conduct clarifying that their role is to assist the court, not to advocate
for a party; providing juries with charges that assist them in preventing
over-deference to distinguished experts and over reliance on scientific
constructs; ensuring that disclosure principles are complied with so that
cross-examination occurs as informed as possible; increased education
of all legal players."'
These examples represent an attempt to refine existing practices. For

Acharya, these "enhancements to the existing adversarial procedure
are all likely to improve the legal system's ability to understand and

119. Acharya, supra note I at 44.

Trial by Theory: A Response to Acharya's
"Law's Treatment of Science"

87

use science." 20 In reality, most are already in place across the common
law world. Experts, by way of example, always knew they had a formal
obligation to be truthful, juries in most common law jurisdictions obtain
some kind of directions or warnings about expert evidence, and crossexamination is universally available. These refinements have not exerted
a discernible influence on the quality of forensic science and medicine or
the ability of the criminal justice system to process it.121
Acharya goes beyond this conventional response to suggest that
"better protection of the accused could be achieved by advocating for an
increase in the standard of proof required to convict an accused person." 22
Although original, this proposal seems unlikely for a variety of theoretical
and practical reasons. The standard "beyond reasonable doubt" is already
so onerous, at least theoretically, that there is really nowhere to go. It is,
however, consistent with Acharya's confidence in the ability of the burden
of proof to regulate the assessment of evidence.
We doubt whether any of the proposed reforms, including Justice
Goudge's admissibility proposal and even our demonstrable reliability
standard, will dramatically change legal practice without attendant
changes to legal culture(s).123 Nevertheless, there are deeper, structural
problems with Acharya's approach to legal reform. We are not sure why
some changes and recommendations appear to be procedurally legitimate
and others, including our own, seem to be illegitimate.
Acharya accepts the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence and goes
even further, suggesting that Justice Goudge's recommendation, especially
with respect to better funding of the defence, enhance "procedural

legitimacy."1 24
Thus, rather than compromising the pre-existing admissibility rules,
Goudge J.'s recommendations serve to enhance the application of these

rules.125

120. Ibid.
121. Gary Edmond, S Cole, Emma Cunliffe & Andrew Roberts, "Admissibility compared: The
reception of incriminating expert opinion (i.e., forensic science) evidence in four adversarial
jurisdictions" (2013) U Deny Crim L Rev (forthcoming).
122. Acharya, supranote I at 27-28.
123. In New South Wales there seems to be a slow change in judicial thinking and practice, though
with limited reform to the actual admissibility standards themselves. See, e.g., Morgan v The Queen,
[2011] NSWCCA 257; Wood v The Queen, [2012] NSWCCA 21; Gilham v The Queen, [2012]
NSWCCA 131.
124. Acharya, supranote I at 30.
125. Ibid at 30.
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In the end, support for Justice Goudge's recommendations flows from
Acharya's "impression.. .that it presents a balanced and, principled
assessment of the science and law interaction."' 26
Acharya's support for the Goudge recommendations and rejection of
our position and its purportedly deleterious system implications is all the
more curious when their respective implications are actually considered.
In practice, the differences between the Goudge recommendations and
our own proposal are, as explained in Part V, relatively minor. The major
practical difference would be that in some modest proportion of cases the
tribunal of fact will have to assess incriminating expert opinion evidence
that would have been excluded on our proposal. Moreover, in a large
proportion of these cases, it will be a trial judge making decisions about
admissibility and weight. 27 In practice, the difference would only manifest
in cases where the expert opinion meets "threshold reliability" but does
not satisfy the "demonstrably reliable" standard. 2 8 That is, the judge or
jury would no longer be expected to assess expert opinions of unproven
or unknown reliability under our proposals. Only opinions that had some
credible grounding could inform determinations of guilt. This, we contend,
is not especially radical-legally or epistemologically. Certainly, it is not
as radical as raising the standard of proof.
Acharya promotes an idealized (or essentialist) approach to law
and legal practice. Conventional legal processes, subject to some types
of reform driven by judges, seem to be reified. We in contrast, reject
the contention that changes to legal practice that are driven by principle
and evidence about their effects, and possibly other factors such as cost,
necessarilydistort, compromise or undermine institutional legitimacy. We
are, though, concerned with the performance of the system and outcomes
rather than "enhanc[ing] the application of... rules."
Acharya has not provided a mechanism for reform, nor identified
system values that would provide some justification for modifying
procedures, nor a framework for evaluating change. In such circumstances
we are left to wonder how "procedural legitimacy" can be maintained if the
procedures are changed or even refined? On what basis are Justice Goudge's
126. Ibid at 4 [emphasis added].
127. This itself seems to be a problem, though one beyond the scope of this essay. See generally, A
Wistrich, C Guthrie & J Rachlinski, "Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of
Deliberately Disregarding" (2005) 153 U Pa L Rev 1251.
128. We were also concerned about the large volume of charges that are processed beyond the
court and the public gaze. Acharya's essay, and the championing of procedural legitimacy, offers
little assistance in relation to the use of unreliable and speculative opinions to induce guilty pleas.
By requiring the state to actually evaluate and, if necessary, refine forensic science and medicine
techniques and the expression of opinions, we hope to exert some, albeit weak, influence on practices
beyond the courtroom.
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recommendations acceptable and why do they not compromise procedural
legitimacy? Why should judges take notice of the recommendations
following the Goudge Inquiry but not those of the NAS or other bodies
that have criticized the state of current forensic science and medicine?
Similarly, why was Mohan acceptable and why does it bear an importance
in her analysis that subsequent cases such as JLJor Trochym do not? More
to the point, if the Supreme Court subsequently adopted a demonstrable
reliability standard would that be improper? And, extending this out, is
Acharya's analysis limited to Canada? We wonder whether Daubert is
procedurally legitimate? Alternatively, are systems that resist some kind
of reliability threshold-such as Australian jurisdictions, England and
Wales-procedurally illegitimate? In our view, Acharya has yet to provide
a yardstick to determine when a particular change is (il)legitimate or what
might count as a just measure of science.129
Conclusion
Certainly, it is desirable to avoid legal decisions that are blatantly
contrary to scientific knowledge. 3 o
In ACA we were careful to place emphasis on the need for any revised
admissibility standard to be reflexive-that is informed by the emerging
evidence about wrongful convictions, recent and authoritative criticisms
of the forensic sciences (e.g., NAS report), and empirical evidence about
the performance of trial safeguards (e.g., Law Commission of England
and Wales) and legal personnel."' In consequence, reform requires
shifts in beliefs and commitments (some longstanding)-from lawyers
and judges-and probably more dramatic changes to actual practice.
Theoretically oriented commitments, in combination with insensitivity to
critical discussions beyond the courts, are unlikely to lead lawyers and
judges to improve their practices.
Given our emphasis on the need to consider developments beyond the
law, it is useful to conclude this response with the recent reflections of two
eminent judges. The first, Judge Harry T. Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge
and Chief Judge Emeritus for the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, was one of the two chairs for the NAS inquiry and report.
Before the NAS inquiry, Judge Edwards seems to have been confident
about the state's forensic science and medicine as well as the performance

129. D Nelken, "A Just Measure of Science" in M Freeman & H Reece, eds, Science in Court
(Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1998).
130. Acharya, supranote I at 2.
131. Edmond & Roach, supranote 1 at 397.
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of trial and appellate courts. Of the following extracts, the first is taken
from the NAS report and the other two from an essay written shortly after
its release.
The report finds that the existing legal regime-including the rules
governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable standards
governing appellate review of trial court decisions, the limitations of the
adversary process, and judges and lawyers who often lack the scientific
expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidenceis inadequate to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic
science disciplines.' 32
I started this project with no preconceived views about the forensic
science community. Rather, I simply assumed, as I suspect many of my
judicial colleagues do, that forensic science disciplines typically are
well-grounded in scientific methodology and that crime laboratories
and forensic science practitioners follow proven practices that ensure
the validity and reliability of forensic evidence offered in court. I was
surprisingly mistaken..."I
Unfortunately,the adversarial approach to the submission of evidence in
court is not well suited to the task offinding "scientific truth." Thejudicial
system is encumbered by, among other things, judges, lawyers, and jurors
who generally lack the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and
evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner; defense attorneys
who often do not have the resources to challenge prosecutors' forensic
experts; trial judges (sitting alone) who must decide evidentiary issues
without the benefit of judicial colleagues and often with little time for
extensive research and reflection; and very limited appellate review of
trial court rulings admitting disputed forensic evidence. Furthermore, the
judicial system embodies a case-by-case adjudicatory approach that is
not well suited to address the systematic problems in many of the various
forensic science disciplines.'34
The second judge, Justice Ian Binnie, has written about the need to
reform the rules concerning expert opinion evidence, contending that:
[t]he theory has always been that a trial of fiercely contending positions
will ultimately reveal the truth, a theory not unlike Adam Smith's vision
of the Invisible Hand, which guides its warring participants towards
production of the optimum result. In courtrooms, as well as in the
investment banking business, the thought has belatedly occurred to people
that the Invisible Hand has its limitations as a control mechanism."'

132. NAS report, supra note 2 at 85.
133. Harry T Edwards, "Solving the Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community" (2009)
50 Jurimetrics J 5 at 8. See also HT Edwards, "The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic
Sciences: What It Means for the Bench and Bar" (2010) 51 Jurimetrics J 1.
134. Ibid at 19 [emphasis added].
135. Justice Ian Binnie, "The Changing Role of the Expert Witness" (2010) 49 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) at
179-180.
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He concludes that: "[t]he public is rightly shocked by the scandal of
demonstrated miscarriages of justice based on flawed expert testimony as
disclosed by the Goudge Inquiry into Dr. Charles Smith, and the Kaufman
inquiry into the wrongful conviction of Guy Paul Morin. The Courts ignore
public shock at their peril," he observes, adding that "[ilt seems evident
that if the Courts are to continue to offer themselves as a credible source
of dispute resolution, the traditional rather amateurish way of receiving
and assessing expert evidence will have to be modified and improved."1 6
The time for appeals to legitimacy through the application of
conventional legal procedure is over. Legal institutions need to come to
terms with their complicity in the use and legitimation of many forms of
forensic science and medical practices that have proven not to be reliable
in a considerable number of cases. Even when procedurally regular, the
wrongful convictions revealed in these cases have eroded the legitimacy
of criminal justice systems throughout the world and engendered demands
for reforms, including reforms to the rules governing the admissibility of
expert opinion evidence. The challenge for the future concerns the terms
on which legal and regulatory institutions develop procedures to engage
with scientists and scientific knowledge and begin to evaluate their own
performances. These are the only hopes for legal institutions interested in
retaining autonomy, improving practices relative to espoused goals, and
enhancing their social legitimacy.

136. lbid at 191, 186.

